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Abstract
In this contribution we analyze the effect that mutual information
has on the actual performance of efficient negotiation methods. Specif-
ically, we start by proposing the theoretical notion of Abstract Negoti-
ation Method (ANM) as a map from the negotiation domain in itself,
for any utility profile of the parties. ANM can face both direct and
iterative negotiations, since we show that ANM class is closed under
the limit operation.
The generality of ANM is proven by showing that it captures a large
class of well known in literature negotiation methods like: the Nash’s
bargaining solution, all the methods derived by multi criteria decision
theory and, in particular, the ones based on Lagrange multipliers, the
Single Negotiating Text which was used in the Camp David Accords,
the Improving Direction Method, and so on.
Hence we show that if mutual information is assumed then any
Pareto efficient ANM is manipulable by one single party or by a col-
lusion of few of them. At this point, we concern about the efficiency
of the resulting manipulation. Thus we find necessary and sufficient
conditions those make manipulability equivalent to actual inefficiency,
meaning that the manipulation implies a change of the efficient fron-
tier so the Pareto efficient ANM converges to a different, hence actually
inefficient, frontier.
In particular we distinguish between strong and weak actual inef-
ficiency. Where, the strong actual inefficiency is a drawback which is
not possible to overcome of the ANMs, like the Pareto invariant one, so
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its negotiation result is invariant for any two profiles of utility which
share the same Pareto frontier, we present. While the weak actual
inefficiency is a drawback of any mathematical theorization on ratio-
nal agents which constrain in a particular way their space of utility
functions.
For the weak actual inefficiency we then state a principle of Re-
sult’s Inconsistency by showing that to falsify theoretical hypotheses
is rational for any agent which is informed about the preference of the
other, even if the theoretical assumptions, which constrain the space
of agents’ utilities, are exact in the reality, i.e. the preferences of each
single agent are well modeled. In essence we show that, under weak ac-
tual inefficiency assumption, any mathematical model which correctly
capture the reality, it produces inconsistent results.
Keywords. Negotiation, Pareto Efficiency, Mutual Information, Manipu-
lation, Collusion, Result’s Inconsistency by Rationality.
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Engage people with what they expect; it is what they are able to discern and confirms their
projections. It settles them into predictable patterns of response, occupying their minds while
you wait for the extraordinary moment - that which they cannot anticipate. (Sun Tzu)
1 Introduction
The rise of efficiency by rationality is not trivial when the interaction be-
tween two or more Decision Makers (DM’s) is considered. Clearly in finding
a trade-off between parties preferences, the crucial role is always played by
mutual information; for example, in [Ker01], the author shows how knowing
mutual utilities allows to reach efficiency by means of the straightforward
illustration of the “orange”.
Nevertheless, in a conflict situation the idea of sharing proper preferences
with the opponents is impracticable, thus the rise of the necessity in hav-
ing an extern trusted party which can find the best settlement by knowing
everything of everyone.
For this reason in the last century, the problem of how to implement such
extern trusted party has been widely approached under different perspectives
giving rise to the Negotiation Analysis, an interdisciplinary effort which aims
to draw a prescriptive theory for negotiators, see [Rai82] of Raiffa which is
a pioneer of this field.
Between all the theories of interest, the two most prolifically used are
Game Theory and Multiple Criteria Decision Making, see [Seb08] for a punc-
tual survey of the last half century evolution of the Negotiation Analysis
concept.
In game theoretical approach to negotiation, see [Bra90] for a wide range
of negotiation techniques, there is not a real extern party but its function
is instead achieved by the same negotiating parties which coordinates them
selfs by means of a predetermined scheme of interaction called game.
In the other approach, instead, the real extern party, which is called
negotiator, privately collects informations related to individual preferences
and then he implements a multi criteria decision making algorithm to find
a “win-win” settlement which is Pareto efficient.
The choice of these two theory is natural since the first one models
interaction dynamics while the second one trade-offs.
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Moreover, due to the flourish of electronic transactions in the last decade,
negotiation techniques have the new perspective to became automated ser-
vices those can be worldwide offered to find Pareto efficient gains in several
contexts see, for example: [TWW94] for a classification of modeling aids,
[RT03] for a report on the development of interactive electronic negotiations
in the supply chain, [GBP00] for an artificial intelligence perspective of ne-
gotiating techniques, and [EKH01] for a potentially universal negotiation
platform.
Even if both game theoretical and multi criteria decision making ap-
proaches to negotiation achieve the same results, the techniques, which are
based on the latter theory, are widely imposing as the best candidates to
automated negotiations, since they open to the whole literature about op-
timization and control, due to their numerical and analytical root. Never-
theless there are tacit differences between the two problems and the most
relevant is that in multi criteria decision making there is one single DM,
who possesses multiple conflicting interests, while in negotiation each utility
is associated to a different DM. This slight discrepancy is determinant in
practices because a single rational DM has no incentive to be inefficient,
while the same DM is pushed by rationality to pursue his own good even if
this would imply a global inefficiency of the negotiation dynamic, whenever
that global inefficiency leads him a payoff which is better than the one he
would get in the efficient case.
In fact rationality is a local property that is owned by each DM, which
does all his best to pursuit his own good, whereas efficiency is a global
property in the sense that it is referred to the outcome of their interaction.
It is not difficult to see that fully rational DM’s often fail to reach an efficient
interaction if they negotiate without an external aid.
However the growth of computational power, that caused the born of
electronic negotiations, is itself a potential danger for this field of applica-
tions; in fact it is not difficult to imagine a software specifically designed to
exploit eventual lacks of a negotiation protocol. For example in [Vet09], the
authors propose a volume based method to learn mutual information during
the negotiation so to reach efficient settlements, which can be reversed engi-
neered to be used, within any other negotiation method, by a party to learn
mutual informations and to exploit them during the negotiation process.
The rule of mutual information is determinant and well studied, for ex-
ample, in the Social Choice theory, which is close to negotiation, where
the well-known result due to Arrow, in [Arr50], states that it is impossi-
ble to aggregate personal welfare functions efficiently and independently to
irrelevant alternatives if the absence of a dictatorial party is assumed. More-
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over Gibbard, in [Gib73], and Satterthwaite independently showed that by
renouncing to the independence of irrelevant alternatives in seeking of non-
dictatorship leads to manipulable welfares aggregations. Hence a party can
obtain a better ending welfare by making-up his own declarations so to
exploit the knowledge of the other social parties.
Both results are originally formulated into a finite space of alternatives
and other differences subsist between social choice and negotiation problems,
in fact a negotiation can default and the status quo can be an inner point
of the negotiation domain, for example in iterative negotiation methods
or in the improving ones. However there are several evidences that Social
Choice like statements could hold also within negotiation. In fact, it is well
known that some of the most diffused Pareto efficient negotiation methods
are sensible to manipulatory or collusive behaviors, like, for example, the
Adjusted Winner procedure ([BT95]), which is not truthful as detailed in
[Rai82], and the Improving Direction Method ([EVH99]) which is proven to
be both not truthful and information leaking in [BMed].
Moreover in [BM11], the authors shows that if the status quo is exogenous
to the negotiation domain, like in Social Choice theory, both Arrow’s and
Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s results can be extended to negotiation over contin-
uous issues, thus in this contribution we decided to explore what mutual
information implies if the status quo is in the negotiation domain, like in
iterative negotiation methods.
In the first part of Section 2 we fix the notions which we are going to
use later in the section to define the class of Abstract Negotiation Methods.
This general framework allows us to move the analysis of a negotiation
methods from a prescriptive point of view to an analytical one, giving us
the possibility to state general results about what can be really achieved in
a negotiation process. In Subsection 2.1 we explore some notions of Pareto
efficiency for ANMs and in Subsection 2.2 we show the equivalence between
direct Pareto efficient, or “one-shot” Pareto efficient, and improving acyclic
iterative negotiations by showing that each iterative ANM has a limit which
is an ANM that achieve the same results in just one iteration.
We show, in Section 3, that the hypotheses, in particular the continuity
ones, used to define ANMs are minimal since they are able to generalize
a wide class of different approach to negotiations, namely: in Subsection
3.1 the Egalitarian and the Nash’s Bargaining solution, as presented respec-
tively in [Kal77] and [Nas50], the Multi-Criteria Decision Making strategies
based on Lagrange Multipliers, like the ones used in [Hei99, JSJJ08], in Sub-
section 3.2 and, in Subsection 3.3, the Single Negotiating Text framework,
introduced by Fisher in [Fis78], and implemented in the Improved Direction
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Method which is developed in [EVH99, EKH01].
In Section 4 we investigate the connection between efficient negotiation
methods and manipulability and we present a theorem which states that
efficient 2-party ANMs are always manipulable. The same theorem plays
an important role in multi party negotiation when collusions are assumed.
In Subsection 4.1 we give necessary and sufficient conditions under which a
rational manipulation does not alter the real Pareto frontier of parties utili-
ties and we show that both the bargaining solutions, discussed in Subsection
3.1, satisfy this condition.
In Section 5 we show that there are methods which cannot be manipu-
lated so to preserve real efficiency and in subsection 5.1 we study the condi-
tions those make actual inefficient all the efficiently manipulable methods.
We underline an issue due to constraining the utility’s space, frequent prac-
tice in literature, which compromises the possibility to verify the truthfulness
on the hypotheses which drive those constrains.
2 Abstract Negotiation Methods
In what follows, we assume that negotiation domain D ( IRm is closed,
convex and bounded, where the dimension m corresponds to the number
of parameters those are going to be defined during the negotiation process.
Moreover with D◦ we indicate the interior of D and with ∂D its boundary.
For example in fund allocation problems, where a fixed maximum budget
B has to be split between m possible alternatives, the negotiation domain is
the set D = {(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ IR
m|
∑
xj ≤ B, xj ≥ 0}, which contains all the
possible ways to split a quantity bounded by B, among the m alternatives.
We also assume that there are n fully rational Decision Makers (DM’s)
which take part to the negotiation, where full rationality means that each
party i has both a well defined utility function ui : D → IR, i.e. super-level
sets of ui are all closed, convex and they forms a decreasing succession with
a unique global maximum uˆi ∈ D, and the capability to pursue his own
good. We indicate with U the set of all possible functions on D satisfying
the aforementioned properties and a profile of utilities with ~u ∈ Un.
With the next definitions we fix some notions those are going to be
relevant in what follows.
Definition 1. Given a utility function u ∈ U and a point p ∈ D, the regions
of D those are improving, strictly improving and equivalent to p according
to u, are F(u, p) = {x ∈ D|u(x) ≥ u(p)}, F+(u, p) = {x ∈ D|u(x) > u(p)}
and I(u, p) = {x ∈ D|u(x) = u(p)}, respectively.
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The same can be done for a profile of utility functions ~u ∈ Un by means
of the intersection operator
⋂
in the Borel algebra of D subsets.
Definition 2. Given a profile of utility functions ~u ∈ Un and a point p ∈
D, the region of D that jointly improves p according to ~u is F(~u, p) =
n⋂
i=1
F(ui, p). In the same way, the regions of D those improves strictly and
are equivalent to p according to ~u are, respectively, F+(~u, p) =
n⋂
i=1
F+(ui, p)
and I(~u, p) =
n⋂
i=1
I(ui, p).
In order to deal with negotiation axiomatically, we give the following
general definition of negotiation method which does not concern about the
actual procedure that allows the ending settlement to be reached.
Definition 3 (Abstract Negotiation Method). Given a negotiation domain
D, an n-party Abstract Negotiation Method (ANM) is a mapM : Un×D →
U .
In this setting, the final settlement, or outcome, of a negotiation process,
which implements M and starts by x0 ∈ D, is naturally defined as the
concave optimization problem
S(M, ~u, x0) = argmax
x∈D
M(~u, x0)(x). (1)
Clearly the maximization problem S is well defined since M(~u, x0) is in U
and D is bounded, closed and convex. Furthermore the gap between the
evaluation of M and the search of S is merely a numerical matter and
several generalizations can be introduces within the space U without com-
promising the tractability of the global theory. For example, if the concavity
is relaxed to quasi-concavity the problem can be still numerically solved by
using relaxation techniques like the one introduced in [OR70] or the concave
equivalent of Graduated Non-Convexity approximation, see [BZ87].
This definition of negotiation model considers as equivalent all those
actual negotiating procedures which achieve the same ending settlement
whenever they are fed with the same profile of utilities and starting point
as inputs. Thus allowing us to move the focus from a prescriptive point of
view, which studies the way parties have to be coordinated by the negotiator,
to an analytical one, which permits us to reason about what a negotiation
process can actually achieve in terms of parties goods.
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Remark. The presence of starting point x0, which is endogenous to the
negotiation domain D, determines the possibility that the negotiation can
default. In fact at least a party exists which rejects the negotiation out-
come whenever S(M, ~u, x0) 6∈ F(~u, x0) otherwise S(M, ~u, x0) is improving
everyone’s utility so, by means of rationality, no party is going to reject the
negotiation outcome. The condition under which a negotiation does never
default, is the Pareto efficiency which is the topic of the next subsection.
In order to avoid that the negotiation outcome is heavily affected either
by small perturbations of the starting point or small changes of the utility
profile, we introduce the following notion of continuity.
Definition 4. A negotiation method M on D is continuous if and only if
S(M, ~u, ·) is a continuous map from D to itself, for any fixed ~u ∈ Un; and
a pseudometric µ on Un exists for which S(M, ·, x0) is continuous form U
n
to D, for any fixed x0 ∈ D.
The choice of the pseudometric µ is sensible and its metric identification
is directly connected to the invariance properties that usually arise in dealing
with utility functions representing preference systems. In the following, we
refers only to continuous ANM even if not directly stated.
An important property that a good negotiation method is likely to have
is the fairness; we refer to the weaker condition of symmetry meaning that
the ANM is invariant under any change of the parties order.
Definition 5. An ANM M is symmetric if and only if
S(M, ~u, x) = S(M, ~uσ , x)
for every permutation σ of the parties index.
2.1 Pareto Efficiency
Let us enter in the main topic of this contribution by indicating with P(~u)
the set of all those points which cannot be further improved, formally
P(~u) = {x ∈ D|F(~u, x) = {x}},
and with H(C, x) the set of hyperplanes which support the convex set C
at its border point x. Then, the following proposition is a necessary and
sufficient condition, in therms of supporting hyperplanes, for a point x to
lie on P(~u), which we are going to use in the following sections.
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Proposition 1. x ∈ P(~u) if and only if H ∈ H(F(~uA, x)) ∩H(F(~u−A, x))
exists which separate F(~uA, x) and F(~u−A, x), for all A ⊂ {1, . . . , n}
Proof. F(~uA, x) and F(~u−A, x) are always convex intersecting at x; the con-
dition of Pareto efficiency F(~uA, x)∩F(~u−A, x) = {x} is then equivalent to
their separability through an hyperplane.
If the functions ui’s are all concave then the Geoffrion’s result, in [Geo68],
holds; thus the weighing method < w, ~u >, when the weight vector w varies
over the set W+n = {w ∈ IR
n|wi ≥ 0∀i = 1, . . . , n and
∑
wi = 1}, charac-
terizes all the points in P(~u).
Definition 6. An ANM M is Pareto efficient if and only if S(M, ~u, x0) ∈
P(~u), for all (~u, x0) ∈ U
n ×D.
By definition a Pareto efficient settlement cannot be improved without
penalizing at least a party, thus the importance of these points since they
are terminal. In fact if a negotiation reaches a Pareto efficient point then
there is at least a party which is going to reject a change of that settlement.
In this sense Pareto efficient settlement can be considered fixed points under
the action of the map M(~u, ·) : D → D.
Notice that Pareto efficient ANM are direct methods since they reach
directly a fixed point.
2.2 Iterative ANMs and Limit Efficiency
In real negotiations, where implementability matters, there are several dif-
ficulties in dealing with direct Pareto efficient ANM, especially due to the
necessity to express a closed form function representing a party’s prefer-
ences. Hence direct methods often leave place to iterative ones, those allow
to gradually reach the ending settlement by locally searching for joint gains,
like in the single negotiating text ([Fis78]) or in the methods developed in
[EH01, Hei99]. In spite of implementability, direct methods are widely used
for theoretical proposes due to their tractability.
For these reasons in this Subsection we firstly introduce iterative ANMs
and then we state necessary and sufficient conditions under which an itera-
tive method has a direct equivalent which is Pareto efficient; thus we can still
refer to direct methods, in place of iterative ones, to analyze what efficient
negotiations can actually achieve.
Definition 7 (Iterative ANM). Given an ANM M : Un × D → D, an n-
parties Iterated ANM Mt (IANM) which implements M is a negotiation
method that follows the sequent scheme for any given x0 ∈ D:
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1. t← 0;
2. while S(M, ~u, xt) 6∈ {xk}k≤t and ui(S(M, ~u, xt)) ≥ ui(xt) for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n} do
2.1. xt+1 ← S(M, ~u, xt);
2.2. t← t+ 1;
3. x∗ ← xt
4. return x∗.
The first condition S(M, ~u, xt) 6∈ {xk}k≤t, in line 2, ensures that the
negotiation does not loop between two or more points that are considered
equivalent by all parties thus avoiding the so called bad faith negotiation,
i.e. when parties negotiate without a real improving intent.
Whereas the second condition derives from the assumption of rationality
which implies parties to continue the negotiation until at least one of them
is actually penalized by the next contract.
Both this conditions can be relaxed by constraining the class of ANMs,
thus requiring the negotiator to be some how smarter.
Definition 8. An ANM M is acyclic if and only if, for all ~u ∈ Un and
x0 ∈ D the condition S(M, ~u, xt) 6∈ {xk}k≤t is never satisfied for xt 6∈ P(~u).
Definition 9. An ANM M is improving if and only if, for all ~u ∈ Un the
following inequality holds:
S(M, ~u, x) ∈ F(~u, x), (2)
moreoverM is jointly improving if and only if S(M, ~u, x) ∈ F+(~u, x), when-
ever x 6∈ P(~u).
Proposition 2. If M is jointly improving then it is acyclic.
The following proposition allows us to relax the while loop conditions in
case of at least improving ANMs.
Proposition 3. If M is at least improving and acyclic then the stop con-
ditions are redundant.
Nevertheless we decide to do not suppress the utility not-penalizing con-
dition because parties should always have the right to stop the negotiation
process and moreover its redundancy vanish whenever parties declare false
statements to the negotiator, hence its necessity is going to be evident from
Section 4 when strategical behavior about declarations is analyzed.
The next proposition shows that the last definitions are not redundant.
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Proposition 4. Any direct Pareto efficient ANM M is improving and
acyclic. Moreover if M is symmetric then it is jointly improving
Proof. The first part is trivial by looking at the definition of Pareto efficiency.
Let us so consider a Pareto efficient ANMM which is not jointly improving
then, for every x0 ∈ D, at least an i exists for which ui(S(M, ~u, x0)) =
ui(x0), meaning that an (n−1)-party M˜ exists andM(~u, x0) = M˜(~u−i, x0)·
I(F(~u, x0)), with I(F(~u, x0)) the characteristic function of F(~u, x0). Clearly
M(~u, x0) is not symmetric.
Remark. Being jointly improving does not implies symmetry and a simple
counterexample is a weighted version of the Nash’s bargaining solution
M(~u, x0) = (u1(x)− u1(x0))
α1 · (u2(x)− u2(x0))
α2 ,
for any α1, α2 > 0 with α1 + α2 = 1 and αi 6= 1/2.
By indicating with |F(~u, x0)| the finite value of
∫
F(~u, x0)dx, which is the
measure of the feasible region of ~u at x0, the following limit theorem partially
reverses the previous proposition and it allows us to consider only Pareto
efficient ANM, thus to remove the complication that iteration represents.
Theorem 5. Mt always converges to a Pareto efficient settlement if and
only if M is at least improving and acyclic.
Proof. (⇒) If Mt converges to a Pareto efficient settlement then the stop
conditions at line 2 in Definition 7 never hold; thus S(M, ~u, x) ∈ F(~u, x)
and Mt does not cycle.
(⇐) Let M be an improving and acyclic ANM and Mt its iteration, then
let us assume by absurd that for a fixed (~u, x0) ∈ U
n × D an m > 0 exists
such that limt→∞ |F(~u, xt)| > m, thus x
∗ 6∈ P(~u) and S(M, ~u, x∗) = x∗,
since S(M, ~u, ·) : D → D is continuous and D bounded, closed and convex
thus compact, which contradicts the hypothesis that M is acyclic.
3 Remarkable Examples
In this Section we demonstrate the generality of continuous ANMs by show-
ing that they fit some of the well known in the literature negotiating proce-
dures.
The first example is trivial and has the only propose to show that a
dummy method which returns always the same point regardless its inputs
is an ANM.
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Example 1. Let us consider in a negotiation domain D a point s∗ ∈ D,
then the dummy negotiation method is
Ms∗(~u, x0) = sup
s∈D
d(s, s∗)2 − d(x, s∗)2.
Clearly Ms∗ is constant in both its parameters, thus it is continuous with
respect to both utility profiles and starting points. ClearlyMs∗ is not Pareto
efficient and it is going to default whenever s∗ 6∈ F(~u, x0).
The next examples are less trivial and they represent, by looking at the
different ways to approach negotiation problems, some of the most special-
ized methods.
3.1 Bargaining Solutions
Let Dk2 = {x ∈ IR
2|x1, x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 ≤ k} represents the space of all
possible splits among two parties of a certain finite good.
We can consider the egalitarian bargaining solution (see [Kal77]) in D
e(~u, x0) = argmax
x∈D
min(u1(x)− u1(x0), u2(x)− u2(x0)), (3)
where x0 represents an already agreed split, the so called status quo, that
both parties want to improve. This solution can be clearly achieved by
implementing the ANM
Me(~u, x0) = min(u1(x)− u1(x0), u2(x)− u2(x0)) (4)
whose ending settlement according to Equation 1 is exactly the egalitarian
bargaining solution. Moreover the continuity of Me is trivial with respect
to the starting point x0 and the continuity with respect to the utility profile
~u can be proven by fixing a point x¯ ∈ D and using the translation invariant
pseudometric on U
µe(u, v) = sup
x∈D
|u(x)− v(x)− (u(x¯)− v(x¯))|.
We can also consider the Nash’s bargaining solution (see [Nas50])
n(~u, x0) = argmax
x∈D
(u1(x)− u1(x0)) · (u2(x)− u2(x0)), (5)
where, again, x0 is again the status quo. n(~u, x0) can be accomplished by
using the following
Mn(~u, x0) = (u1(x)− u1(x0)) · (u2(x)− u2(x0)), (6)
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which is clearly continuous with respect to the status quo x0 and, by fixing
x¯, x¯ ∈ D, the affine invariant pseudometric on U
µn(u, v) = sup
x∈D
|(v(x¯)− v(x¯)) · (u(x)− u(x¯))− (u(x¯)− u(x¯)) · (v(x)− v(x¯))|
ensures utility profiles continuity of Mn.
3.2 Lagrange Multipliers
In [Hei99], Heiskanen provided an iterative method which uses Lagrange
multipliers to reach Pareto efficient settlements in the negotiation over con-
tinuous issues with concave utility functions. Later, in [JSJJ08], the authors
presented a negotiation algorithm to compute optimal consensus point in
linear utility spaces which also relays on Lagrange multipliers.
In general the strategy behind all negotiation methods which are based
on Lagrange multipliers, is to transform the original negotiation problem{
argmax
x∈D
f(~ui)(x)
< x,∇ui(x0) >≥ 0 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(7)
where f : IRm → R is an aggregating function, for example in [Hei99]
f(~u) =< w, ~u > with w ∈W+n , into a new one
L : argmax
x∈D
f(~u)(x) +
∑
λi· < x,∇ui(x0) > (8)
which has a strictly concave objective and the solution of the problem is
Pareto optimal, meaning that Karush–Kuhn-Tucker conditions hold, for a
suitable choice of λi’s.
Clearly ML(~u, x0) = f(~u) +
∑
λi· < x,∇ui(x0) > is an ANM whose
solution is exactly like the above one and its continuity is trivial with respect
to both x0 and ~u choices.
Notice that both the bargaing solutions of the previous example can be
expressed as a Lagrange multipliers Problem.
3.3 Improving Direction Method
In [EVH99, EKH01, EH01], the authors proposed a jointly improving nego-
tiation method, aligned with the single negotiating text (see [Fis78, FU87,
Rai82]), that requires little more than local evaluations of ∇ui, to find an
improving settlement.
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The map, that the improving direction method proposes, can be written
as idm(~u, x) = l(~u, x, g(~u, x)), where g : Un × D → Bm associates to any
point of D the generalized bisector of the angle spanned by F (ui, x)’s in x,
according to the solution of the following product maximization problem,
see [EKH01] for details,
g(~u, x) =


max
d
n∏
i=1
(∇ui(x)/||∇ui(x)||, d)
di(xt) · d ≥ 0 1 ≤ i ≤ n
d ∈ F (~u, x)
||d||2 = 1
(9)
and l : Un ×D×Bm → D evaluates the maximum step that can be done in
g(~u, x) direction without penalizing any of the Pi’s, formally
l(~u, x, d) = x+
(
min
i
(
argmax
λi
ui(x+ λi · d)
))
· d. (10)
In this case, differently from the ones above, the method has not a closed
functional form since it is already an optimization method, hence we skip the
definition of the ANMMidm which implements IDM, since it can always be
written as the dummy ANM centered in idm(~u, x), and we directly analyze
the continuity of S(Midm, ~u, x) = idm(~u, x).
S(Midm, ~u, x) is clearly continuous as map of D in itself for any fixed ~u
but proving that it is utility profile continuous need some calculation. Thus
let us consider the preference invariant relation p(u, v) ⇔≤u=≤v and the
preference invariant pseudometric
µidm(u, v) = sup
x∈D,
||∇u(x)||6=0
||∇v(x)||6=0
1−
(
(∇u(x),∇v(x))
||∇u(x)|| · ||∇v(x)||
)2
(11)
which, in essence, controls the maximum orthogonal component between
the normalized gradients of u and v; µidm is well defined in the space of
continuously differentiable utility function, which the authors consider, and
it constrains the solution of both equation 9 and 10, thus ensuring that idm
is the ending settlement of a continuous ANM.
Remark. IDM is an iterative method which is jointly improving and by
means of Theorem 5 we know that it exists a direct Pareto efficient method
which achieve the same result.
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4 Pareto Efficiency Implies Manipulability
In this Section we show that Pareto efficiency always implies manipulability
whenever the status quo is endogenous to the negotiation domain D.
Definition 10. An ANM M is manipulable if and only if for every ~u ∈ Un
and x0 at least an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and an u˜i ∈ U exist such that
ui(S(M, ~u−i, u˜i, x0)) > ui(S(M, ~u, x0)).
Proposition 6. If U ′ ⊂ U and M is manipulable within U ′n then it is
manipulable also in Un.
This proposition is trivially true, but it allows us to restrict to
U ′ = {u ∈ U| argmax
s∈D
ui(s) ∈ ∂D}.
We call Ci(M, ~u−i, x0) the set of possible manipulation outcomes of the i-th
party within U ′, formally:
Ci(M, ~u−i, x0) = {x ∈ D|∃ui ∈ U
′ such that x = S(M, ui, ~ui, x0)}.
Lemma 7. If M is efficient and not manipulable by the party i then
Ci(M, ~u−i, x0) is the frontier of a convex set, for all (~u−i, x0) ∈ U
(n−1)×D.
Proof. Firstly we prove that Ci(M, ~u−i, x0) has an empty interior. By as-
suming the contrary, let us take an inner point x¯ ∈ C◦i (M, ~u−i, x0) and let
us consider its associated utility u¯i, then
{x¯} ( F(u¯i, x¯) ∩ Ci(M, ~u−i, x0),
implying that there exists another utility which improves u¯i’s performance
contradicting the hypotheses.
Let now x¯ be again in Ci(M, ~u−i, x0) and u¯i be its associated utility,
thenM is not manipulable by i if and only if < x− x¯,∇u¯i > is a supporting
hyperplane for Ci(M, ~u−i, x0) at x¯ in D. The convexity follows by varying
the couple (x¯, u¯i).
Theorem 8. Any 2-party efficient ANM M is manipulable by at least a
party within U ′ × U ′.
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Proof. We show that ifM is not manipulable by party 2 then it is manipula-
ble by party 1. Hence, for all ~u ∈ U2 and x0 6∈ P(~u) preferred by both parties
to the opponent’s best preference in D, we have that C2(M, u1, x0) is the
frontier of a convex set and clearly x0 ∈ C2(M, u1, x0). Let us now assume
thatM is not manipulable also by party 1, thus let us consider C1(M, u2, x0)
which holds the same properties of x0 ∈ C2(M, u1, x0). Moreover
{x0,S(M, ~u, x0)} ⊂ (C1(M, u2, x0) ∩ C2(M, u1, x0)) ,
uˆ2 = argmax
x∈D
u2(x) ∈ C1(M, u2, x0)
and
uˆ1 = argmax
x∈D
u1(x) ∈ C2(M, u1, x0).
Since party two cannot manipulateM, H(x) =< x−S(M, ~u, x0),∇u¯2 >
is a supporting hyperplane of C2(M, u1, x0) at S(M, ~u, x0) and, in or-
der to be S(M, ~u, x0) Pareto efficient, H should be supporting also to
C1(M, u2, x0) but this is impossible, since the two convex frontier meets
in x0 and H(uˆ2) < 0.
Corollary 9. If an ANM M is Pareto efficient and symmetric then it is
manipulable by each party.
Example 2. The ANM Md(~u, x0) = ui · I(F(~u, x0)) is not symmetric and
it manipulable by all parties but the i-th, since they can reshape F(~u, x0).
Furthermore Md is the equivalent, with an endogenous status quo, of the
dictatorial method which is the only efficient and not manipulable method
whenever the status quo is exogenous. Hence, differently than social choice
theory, efficiency implies manipulability with no exceptions, in negotiation
with a endogenous status quo.
The following definition introduces a generalization of the concept of
manipulation, which naturally arises in multi party negotiation when some
of them form a coalition by sharing the same intent to overcome the others.
Definition 11. A j-party collusion C is a subset of {1, . . . , n} of cardinality
j such that ui1 = ui2 for all i1, i2 ∈ C.
Theorem 10. If an n-party efficient ANM M is not manipulable by the
i-th party then M is manipulable by a collusion of the other n− 1 parties.
Proof. Whenever all the parties but the i-th one collude, thenM reduces to
a 2-party efficient negotiation ANM and the proof comes easily by applying
the Theorem 8.
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The same arguments apply to the following Theorems.
Theorem 11. If an n-party efficient ANM M is not manipulable by the a
collusion of all the parties but the i-th one, then M is manipulable by the
i-th party.
Theorem 12. If an n-party efficient ANMM is not manipulable by j-party
collusion, then it is manipulable by the collusion of the other n− j.
4.1 Efficient Manipulability
At this point to ask whether a possible manipulation does affect the real
efficiency of a method is a legitimate question.
Let us indicate with C(M) ⊂ {1, . . . , n} the set of the parties which can
manipulate the method M.
Definition 12. An efficient ANM M is efficiently manipulable if and only
if
∃u∗i ∈
{
arg sup
u˜i∈U
ui(S(M, u˜i, ~u−i, x0))
}
(12)
such that P(u˜i, ~u−i) = P(~u), for all (~u, x0) ∈ U
n ×D and all i ∈ C(M).
The following is a sufficient condition to ensure efficient manipulability
which is suitable to capture the bargaining solutions described in Section 3.
Proposition 13. If M is efficient and for every fixed (~u, x0) ∈ U
n × D,
i ∈ C(M) and ǫ > 0 an uǫi ∈ U exists such that P(u
ǫ
i , ~u−i) = P~u and
|S(M, uǫi , ~u−i, x0)− argmaxx∈F(~u,x0)ui(x)| < ǫ
then M is efficiently manipulable.
Proof. If the hypotheses are true, then the i-th party, in looking for an
manipulating utility, can gain
lim
ǫ→0
S(M, uǫi , ~u−i, x0) = arg max
x∈F(~u,x0)
ui(x),
without moving the Pareto efficient frontier. The result follows since the
right-hand side of the previous equality is the best choice within F(~u, x0)
for party i and the uniqueness of the max.
Corollary 14. The egalitarian bargaining method Me is efficiently manip-
ulable.
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Proof. Let xǫ ∈ P(~u) be a point which is far less than ǫ form
x∗1 = arg max
x∈F(~u,x0)
u1(x)
and let a ∈ (0, u2(x
ǫ)/(u1(x
∗
1) − u1(x0))) then u
ǫ
1 = a · u1 satisfies the hy-
pothesis of Proposition 13.
Corollary 15. The Nash’s bargaining solution Mn is efficiently manipula-
ble.
Proof. It is always possible to choose an αǫ > 1 such that u
ǫ
1(x) = (u1(x)−
u1(x0))
αǫ meets the hypothesis of Proposition 13 for every ǫ > 0.
Corollary 16. The methodMw(~u, x0) =< w, ~u−~u(x0) > + ln(I(F(~u, x0))),
with w ∈W+n is efficiently manipulable.
Proof. It is similar to the proof of Corollary 14.
Example 3. The ANM, in example 2,M(~u, x0) = ui · I(F(~u, x0)) is not ef-
ficiently manipulable. It suffices to see it in 2-party with D planar (m = 2).
In fact if M(u1, u2, x0) = u2 · I(F(u1, u2, x0)) then to find the best manip-
ulation of party 1 is equivalent to solve the following variational problem
V =


arg sup
I∈C1([0,1]→D)
uj
(
arg sup
x∈Ix0
ui(x)
)
I(0) = x0
I(1) ∈ ∂D
I(y) ≥ I(x)+ < ∇I(x), (x− y) >
< ∇I(0),∇u2(0) >> 0
(13)
by finding the right shape of the possible indifference curves I of x0, which
has not necessarily a Pareto preserving solution, meaning that the preferred
point of party 2 on I is not necessarily on P(u1, u2).
Theorem 17. If M is efficient then manipulatory behaviors do not affect
its actual efficiency if and only if M is efficiently manipulable.
Proof. (⇐) Let ~u∗
C(M) be the best manipulatory response of the parties in
C(M) = {i1, . . . , ij} then by the definition of efficient manipulability
P(u∗i1 , ~u−i1) = P(u
∗
i1
, u∗i2 , ~u−{i1,i2}) = . . . = P(~u
∗
C(M), ~u−C(M)) = P(~u).
(⇒) If manipulatory behaviors do not affect the efficiency of the method,
then let us fix i ∈ C(M) and its best manipulation u∗i then, for every
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possible manipulation, not necessarily the best one, of the others ~u′
C(M)\{i},
we have that S(M, u∗i , ~u
′
C(M)\{i}, ~u−C(M), x0) ∈ P(~u) which implies that
P(u∗i , ~u−i) = P(~u), by the arbitrarily and ~u
′
C(M)\{i} and the theorem by the
arbitrarily of i ∈ C(M).
Remark. If an ANM is efficiently manipulable, then there is no rational
reason for a party to manipulate the negotiation by changing the Pareto
frontier. In fact any change of the Pareto frontier would lead to a stronger
loss when the other parties manipulate the negotiation too.
If a negotiation method is efficiently manipulable, then its efficiency
is preserved by means of Theorem 17, thus we now focus on the possible
situations those the efficiency of a method is actually compromised by ma-
nipulatory behaviors.
Notice that we use the term actual inefficiency to underline that the
method, which is proven to be efficient, does not loose its property to end
with a Pareto efficient settlement but the inefficiency is the result of a mali-
cious change of the Pareto frontier whose points are inefficient with respect
to the real one.
5 Actual Inefficiency
Let us firstly present the strongest notion of Actual Inefficiency and then an
example of a method which satisfies it.
Definition 13. Any efficient ANM M is Strong Actual Inefficient if and
only if it is not efficiently manipulable over U .
Let us consider the 2-party budget allocation problem and for any point
x0 ∈ D and any u ∈ U we define the strictly improving frontier of u at x0
the set
Bux0 =
{
x ∈ D|x = x0 + λ¯(y − x0), λ¯ = arg sup
λ≥0
u(x0 + λ(y − x0)), y ∈ D
}
.
(14)
If x ∈ Bux0 then the line xx0 supports F(u, x0) at x0, furthermore if
u1, u2 ∈ U and x0 is strictly preferred by u1 to the best outcome of u2 and
vice versa, then any x∗ ∈ Bu1x0 ∩B
u2
x0
, with x∗ 6= x0, lies on P(u1, u2). More-
over x∗ holding the aforementioned properties is unique whenever u1, u2 ∈
C1(D).
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This simple argument gives us the possibility to present within this con-
text a simple 2-party Pareto invariant ANM
MP(u1, u2, x0) =


Bu1x0 ∩B
u2
x0
\ {x0} if u1, u2 ∈ C
1(D)
arg sup
x∈B
u1
x0
∩B
u2
x0
|x− x0| otherwise. (15)
MP , despite its easy implementability, has a strong theoretical value
since it is never efficiently manipulable. In fact it is not difficult to check
that for any u˜1, such that P(u˜1, u2) = P(u1, u2), it resultsMP(u˜1, u2, x0) =
MP (u1, u2, x0).
Moreover C1(MP , u2, x0) = B
u2
x0
, thus to maximize the manipulation
outcome of party 1 is equivalent to find x∗ = arg sup
x∈B
u2
x0
u1.
5.1 Weak Actual Inefficiency
We now explore a weaker form of actual inefficiency which natural arises
in all those contexts, like economics, where there is an active speculation
about the properties of utility functions with consequent constrains of the
utilities’ space.
Definition 14. Any efficient ANM M is Weak Actual Inefficient on U ′ if
and only if it is efficiently manipulable over U ) U ′ but not over U ′.
The following theorem characterizes a prototypical space U ′ in which the
weak actual inefficiency arises.
Theorem 18. If U ′ is the space of convex combinations of
U = (U1, . . . , U l) ∈ U l and the following properties hold
1. U j(arg sup(U i)) = inf(U j) and arg sup(U i) ∈ ∂D, ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , l},
i 6= j,
2. ∃m : D →W+l continuous and bijective such that
x = arg supy∈Dm(x) · U(y),
then any improving 2-party ANMM is weakly actual inefficient on U ′, when-
ever there is perfect competition among parties.
Proof. By the perfect competition assumption, we have that u1, u2 have
maxima uˆ1, uˆ2 ∈ ∂D, u1(uˆ2) = inf(u1) and vice versa. Moreover, since m
is one-to-one and continuous, C1(M, u2, x0) ∩ C2(M, u1, x0) ∩ P(u1, u2) =
{S(M, u1, u2, x0)}, like in the proof of Theorem 8. Thus any manipulation
compromises the efficiency of M.
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Example 4. Let us consider again the 2-party budget splitting problem
and, like in [EH01, EKH01, EVH99, LM80], let us think at the space U ′
consisting in all the convex combinations of the following utility functions
U1 = ln(x1), U
2 = ln(x2) and U
3 = ln(B − x1 − x2). Clearly U
′ satisfies
the hypotheses of Theorem 18, thus any efficient method, included the ones
presented in the aforementioned articles, are weakly actual inefficient on U ′.
Despite strong actual inefficiency cannot be overcame since it is a prop-
erty that globally holds on U , weak actual inefficiency is local on U ′ ⊂ U
and can be eliminated by enlarging U ′.
If U ′ induces weak actual inefficiency of an efficiently manipulable M,
then there are two different scenarios
1. parties are forced to stick with utilities in U ′, like for example in all
those software implementations where party can only express the pa-
rameters a ∈W+l which codifies their utilities;
2. parties can “escape” from U ′.
If the first scenario holds then the weak actual inefficiency becomes sub-
stantially a strong actual inefficiency. Otherwise in the latter scenario parties
are going to falsify the theoretical hypotheses which led to identify the class
U ′ by picking a manipulating utility outside U ′ even if their real one is in
U ′, meaning that the theoretical hypotheses are true.
Let us call the triplet M = (D,U ′,M) a model of interaction in D, with
preferences in U ′ and according to the method M, then the next theorem
codifies the latter scenario.
Theorem 19. Let M = (D,U ′,M) be a model of the interaction within an
n-party system S. If U ) U ′ exists, such that M is weak actual inefficient
on U ′, then the theoretical results obtained by applying M are going to be
inconsistent with the actual dynamic of S, whenever there is a manipulatory
behavior.
Moreover, if interactions between the parties of a systems are done ac-
cording to an efficient manipulable ANM M, then nothing more then the
obvious can be said about the dynamic of the systems. In fact, it is possible
to say no more that it is going to converge on the Pareto efficient fortier,
which is trivial by the efficiency ofM. In addition there is no way to identify
the real method that the system uses to gain efficiency since it is impossible
to discriminate between any two ones which are efficiently manipulable.
21
6 Conclusions
We introduced the notion of abstract negotiation method which, in essence,
captures some of the direct and recursive negotiation methods which are
well-known in literature. We showed that if the status quo is endogenous
to the negotiation domain then efficiency always implies manipulability by
either parties or collusion of them.
Then we focused on the effects those manipulatory behaviors have on
the real efficiency of efficient negotiation methods. In exploring the topic,
we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a manipulation to do not
alter the real Pareto efficient frontier; then we focus in looking for all those
situations under which this is not true. So we show that there are methods,
like the presented Pareto invariant one, in which it is not possible to manip-
ulate efficiently a negotiations, and also that there are subspaces of utility
functions in which manipulations always compromise the real efficiency. Re-
garding the latter situation we underline that it is possible to overcome the
actual inefficiency by allowing parties to exit from the aforementioned space
of utility.
There are several possibility to extend the results presented in this con-
tribution, which we are going to investigate. One over all: to overcome
the impossibility to negotiate efficiently and in a not manipulable way by
renouncing to the determinism of the negotiation method.
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